Archive for the ‘Vida ou Não-Vida Após a Morte’ Category

O que faz voce,voce?

quinta-feira, janeiro 5th, 2017

xxxx

( Copiar e traduzir este artigo. E’  muito importante sobre o conhecimento e teorias atuais da mente)

What Makes You You?

http://waitbutwhy.com/2014/12/what-makes-you-you.html

What Makes You You?

Ensaio do meu comentário a ser postado:

Congratulations, a collection of theories about the issue. There is another theory suggesting a new idea – the Matrix/DNA Theory. This theory introduces his theoretical model of the link between cosmological and biological evolution. It is the building block of galaxies (showed at my avatar above) which happens to be the same building blocks of DNA ( a lateral pair of nucleotides). The difference is

Bons Comentarios:

Corneliu Coman ·

Hey Tim! I’ve asked myself the same question over and over again, since i’ve put a lot of effort into finding “who I am”. My conclusion was close to the “continuity” (I am who I decide to be-or become).

But there goes another dillema: does any of your neurons think “I’m Tim?” or “I am Tim’s Neuron?” or “I am Neuron #1.002.125 of Tim’s Body”? Probably no (how can we know)?

So imagine Earth (or countries or whatever bigger instance) as “the bigger organism” and YOU as the neuron from the example above. Would your previous arguments still stand? probably yes. cell have atoms, molecules, dna and organelles.

So, would you realize your identity is a part of something, and you are not a stand-alone organism? Or you are stand-alone, but you cannot live isolated, so you are completely dependant to other cells (people).

So, finally, my greatest dillema: why do I see the world through my eyes (my body’s eyes) and not through yours. Or his. Or hers? It doesn’t make sense that I should be confined to myself.
Can it because all of us together are the greatest organism and I am just a cell?
Or are we simpy unable (or unconscious) of our ability to perceive everybody else’s brains?

xxxx

Copia para ser traduzida:

When you say the word “me,” you probably feel pretty clear about what that means. It’s one of the things you’re clearest on in the whole world—something you’ve understood since you were a year old. You might be working on the question, “Who am I?” but what you’re figuring out is the who am part of the question—the part is obvious. It’s just you. Easy.

But when you stop and actually think about it for a minute—about what “me” really boils down to at its core—things start to get pretty weird. Let’s give it a try.

The Body Theory

We’ll start with the first thing most people equate with what a person is—the physical body itself. The Body Theory says that that’s what makes you you. And that would make sense. It doesn’t matter what’s happening in your life—if your body stops working, you die. If Mark goes through something traumatic and his family says, “It really changed him—he’s just not the same person anymore,” they don’t literally mean Mark isn’t the same person—he’s changed, but he’s still Mark, because Mark’s body is Mark, no matter what he’s acting like. Humans believe they’re so much more than a hunk of flesh and bone, but in the end, a physical ant is the ant, a squirrel’s body is the squirrel, and a human is its body. This is the Body Theory—let’s test it:

So what happens when you cut your fingernails? You’re changing your body, severing some of its atoms from the whole. Does that mean you’re not you anymore? Definitely not—you’re still you.

How about if you get a liver transplant? Bigger deal, but definitely still you, right?

What if you get a terrible disease and need to replace your liver, kidney, heart, lungs, blood, and facial tissue with synthetic parts, but after all the surgery, you’re fine and can live your life normally. Would your family say that you had died, because most of your physical body was gone? No, they wouldn’t. You’d still be you. None of that is needed for you to be you.

Well maybe it’s your DNA? Maybe that’s the core thing that makes you you, and none of these organ transplants matter because your remaining cells all still contain your DNA, and they’re what maintains “you.” One major problem—identical twins have identical DNA, and they’re not the same person. You are you, and your identical twin is most certainly not you. DNA isn’t the answer.

So far, the Body Theory isn’t looking too good. We keep changing major parts of the body, and you keep being you.

But how about your brain?

The Brain Theory

Let’s say a mad scientist captures both you and Bill Clinton and locks the two of you up in a room.

CH

The scientist then performs an operation on both of you, whereby he safely removes each of your brains and switches them into the other’s head. Then he seals up your skulls and wakes you both up. You look down and you’re in a totally different body—Bill Clinton’s body. And across the room, you see your body—with Bill Clinton’s personality.

CFO

Now, are you still you? Well, my intuition says that you’re you—you still have your exact personality and all your memories—you’re just in Bill Clinton’s body now. You’d go find your family to explain what happened:

CF1

CF2

So unlike your other organs, which could be transplanted without changing your identity, when you swapped brains, it wasn’t a brain transplant—it was a body transplant. You’d still feel like you, just with a different body. Meanwhile, your old body would not be you—it would be Bill Clinton. So what makes you you must be your brain. The Brain Theory says that wherever the brain goes, you go—even if it goes into someone else’s skull.

The Data Theory

Consider this—

What if the mad scientist, after capturing you and Bill Clinton, instead of swapping your physical brains, just hooks up a computer to each of your brains, copies every single bit of data in each one, then wipes both of your brains completely clean, and then copies each of your brain data onto the other person’s physical brain? So you both wake up, both with your own physical brains in your head, but you’re not in your body—you’re in Bill Clinton’s body. After all, Bill Clinton’s brain now has all of your thoughts, memories, fears, hopes, dreams, emotions, and personality. The body and brain of Bill Clinton would still run out and go freak out about this to your family. And again, after a significant amount of convincing, they would indeed accept that you were alive, just in Bill Clinton’s body.

Philosopher John Locke’s memory theory of personal identity suggests that what makes you you is your memory of your experiences. Under Locke’s definition of you, the new Bill Clinton in this latest example is you, despite not containing any part of your physical body, not even your brain. 

This suggests a new theory we’ll call The Data Theory, which says that you’re not your physical body at all. Maybe what makes you you is your brain’s data—your memories and your personality.

We seem to be honing in on something, but the best way to get to concrete answers is by testing these theories in hypothetical scenarios. Here’s an interesting one, conceived by British philosopher Bernard Williams:

The Torture Test

Situation 1: The mad scientist kidnaps you and Clinton, switches your brain data with Clinton’s, as in the latest example, wakes you both up, and then walks over to the body of Clinton, where you supposedly reside, and says, “I’m now going to horribly torture one of you—which one should I torture?”

What’s your instinct? Mine is to point at my old body, where I no longer reside, and say, “Him.” And if I believe in the Data Theory, then I’ve made a good choice. My brain data is in Clinton’s body, so I’m now in Clinton’s body, so who cares about my body anymore? Sure, it sucks for anyone to be tortured, but if it’s between me and Bill Clinton, I’m choosing him.

Situation 2: The mad scientist captures you and Clinton, except he doesn’t do anything to your brains yet. He comes over to you—normal you with your normal brain and body—and asks you a series of questions. Here’s how I think it would play out:

Mad Scientist: Okay so here’s what’s happening. I’m gonna torture one of you. Who should I torture?

You: [pointing at Clinton] Him.

MS: Okay but there’s something else—before I torture whoever I torture, I’m going to wipe both of your brains of all memories, so when the torture is happening, neither of you will remember who you were before this. Does that change your choice?

You: Nope. Torture him.

MS: One more thing—before the torture happens, not only am I going to wipe your brains clean, I’m going to build new circuitry into your brain that will convince you that you’re Bill Clinton. By the time I’m done, you’ll think you’re Bill Clinton and you’ll have all of his memories and his full personality and anything else that he thinks or feels or knows. I’ll do the same thing to him, convincing him he’s you. Does that change your choice?

You: Um, no. Regardless of any delusion I’m going through and no matter who I think I am, I don’t want to go through the horrible pain of being tortured. Insane people still feel pain. Torture him.

So in the first situation, I think you’d choose to have your own body tortured. But in the second, I think you’d choose Bill Clinton’s body—at least I would. But the thing is—they’re the exact same example. In both cases, before any torture happens, Clinton’s brain ends up with all of your data and your brain has his—the difference is just at which point in the process you were asked to decide. In both cases, your goal is for you to not be tortured, but in the first situation, you felt that after the brain data swap, you were in Clinton’s body, with all of your personality and memories there with you—while in the second situation, if you’re like me, you didn’t care what was going to happen with the two brains’ data, you believed that you would remain with your physical brain, and body, either way.

Choosing your body to be the one tortured in the first situation is an argument for the Data Theory—you believe that where your data goes, you go. Choosing Clinton’s body to be tortured in the second situation is an argument for the Brain Theory, because you believe that regardless of what he does with your brain’s data, you will continue to be in your own body, because that’s where your physical brain is. Some might even take it a step further, and if the mad scientist told you he was even going to switch your physical brains, you’d still choose Clinton’s body, with your brain in it, to be tortured. Those that would torture a body with their own brain in it over torturing their own body believe in the Body Theory.

Not sure about you, but I’m finishing this experiment still divided. Let’s try another. Here’s my version of modern philosopher Derek Parfit’s teletransporter thought experiment, which he first described in his book Reasons and Persons

The Teletransporter Thought Experiment

It’s the year 2700. The human race has invented all kinds of technology unimaginable in  today’s world. One of these technologies is teleportation—the ability to transport yourself to distant places at the speed of light. Here’s how it works—

You go into a Departure Chamber—a little room the size of a small cubicle.

cube stand

You set your location—let’s say you’re in Boston and your destination is London—and when you’re ready to go, you press the button on the wall. The chamber walls then scan your entire body, uploading the exact molecular makeup of your body—every atom that makes up every part of you and its precise location—and as it scans, it destroys, so every cell in your body is destroyed by the scanner as it goes.

cube beam

When it’s finished (the Departure Chamber is now empty after destroying all of your cells), it beams your body’s information to an Arrival Chamber in London, which has all the necessary atoms waiting there ready to go. The Arrival Chamber uses the data to re-form your entire body with its storage of atoms, and when it’s finished you walk out of the chamber in London looking and feeling exactly how you did back in Boston—you’re in the same mood, you’re hungry just like you were before, you even have the same paper cut on your thumb you got that morning.

The whole process, from the time you hit the button in the Departure Chamber to when you walk out of the Arrival Chamber in London, takes five minutes—but to you it feels instantaneous. You hit the button, things go black for a blink, and now you’re standing in London. Cool, right?

In 2700, this is common technology. Everyone you know travels by teleportation. In addition to the convenience of speed, it’s incredibly safe—no one has ever gotten hurt doing it.

But then one day, you head into the Departure Chamber in Boston for your normal morning commute to your job in London, you press the big button on the wall, and you hear the scanner turn on, but it doesn’t work.

cubicle broken

The normal split-second blackout never happens, and when you walk out of the chamber, sure enough, you’re still in Boston. You head to the check-in counter and tell the woman working there that the Departure Chamber is broken, and you ask her if there’s another one you can use, since you have an early meeting and don’t want to be late.

She looks down at her records and says, “Hm—it looks like the scanner worked and collected its data just fine, but the cell destroyer that usually works in conjunction with the scanner has malfunctioned.”

“No,” you explain, “it couldn’t have worked, because I’m still here. And I’m late for this meeting—can you please set me up with a new Departure Chamber?”

She pulls up a video screen and says, “No, it did work—see? There you are in London—it looks like you’re gonna be right on time for your meeting.” She shows you the screen, and you see yourself walking on the street in London.

“But that can’t be me,” you say, “because I’m still here.”

At that point, her supervisor comes into the room and explains that she’s correct—the scanner worked as normal and you’re in London as planned. The only thing that didn’t work was the cell destroyer in the Departure Chamber here in Boston. “It’s not a problem, though,” he tells you, “we can just set you up in another chamber and activate its cell destroyer and finish the job.”

And even though this isn’t anything that wasn’t going to happen before—in fact, you have your cells destroyed twice every day—suddenly, you’re horrified at the prospect.

“Wait—no—I don’t want to do that—I’ll die.”

The supervisor explains, “You won’t die sir. You just saw yourself in London—you’re alive and well.”

“But that’s not me. That’s a replica of me—an imposterI’m the real me—you can’t destroy my cells!”

The supervisor and the woman glance awkwardly at each other. “I’m really sorry sir—but we’re obligated by law to destroy your cells. We’re not allowed to form the body of a person in an Arrival Chamber without destroying the body’s cells in a Departure Chamber.”

You stare at them in disbelief and then run for the door. Two security guards come out and grab you. They drag you toward a chamber that will destroy your cells, as you kick and scream…

__________

If you’re like me, in the first part of that story, you were pretty into the idea of teletransportation, and by the end, you were not.

The question the story poses is, “Is teletransportation, as described in this experiment, a form of traveling? Or a form of dying?

This question might have been ambiguous when I first described it—it might have even felt like a perfectly safe way of traveling—but by the end, it felt much more like a form of dying. Which means that every day when you commute to work from Boston to London, you’re killed by the cell destroyer, and a replica of you is created.1 To the people who know you, you survive teletransportation just fine, the same way your wife seems just fine when she arrives home to you after her own teletransportation, talking about her day and discussing plans for next week. But is it possible that your wife was actually killed that day, and the person you’re kissing now was just created a few minutes ago?

Well again, it depends on what you are. Someone who believes in the Data Theory would posit that London you is you as much as Boston you, and that teletransportation is perfectly survivable. But we all related to Boston you’s terror at the end there—could anyone really believe that he should be fine with being obliterated just because his data is safe and alive over in London? Further, if the teletransporter could beam your data to London for reassembly, couldn’t it also beam it to 50 other cities and create 50 new versions of you? You’d be hard-pressed to argue that those were all you. To me, the teletransporter experiment is a big strike against the Data Theory.

Similarly, if there were an Ego Theory that suggests that you are simply your ego, the teletransporter does away nicely with that. Thinking about London Tim, I realize that “Tim Urban” surviving means nothing to me. The fact that my replica in London will stay friends with my friends, keep Wait But Why going with his Tuesday-ish posts, and live out the whole life I was planning for myself—the fact that no one will miss me or even realize that I’m dead, the same way in the story you never felt like you lost your wife—does almost nothing for me. I don’t care about Tim Urban surviving. I care about me surviving.

All of this seems like very good news for Body Theory and Brain Theory. But let’s not judge things yet. Here’s another experiment:

The Split Brain Experiment

A cool fact about the human brain is that the left and right hemispheres function as their own little worlds, each with their own things to worry about, but if you remove one half of someone’s brain, they can sometimes not only survive, but their remaining brain half can learn to do many of the other half’s previous jobs, allowing the person to live a normal life. That’s right—you could lose half of your brain and potentially function normally.

So say you have an identical twin sibling named Bob who developes a fatal brain defect. You decide to save him by giving him half of your brain. Doctors operate on both of you, discarding his brain and replacing it with half of yours. When you wake up, you feel normal and like yourself. Your twin (who already has your identical DNA because you’re twins) wakes up with your exact personality and memories.

twins

When you realize this, you panic for a minute that your twin now knows all of your innermost thoughts and feelings on absolutely everything, and you’re about to make him promise not to tell anyone, when it hits you that you of course don’t have to tell him. He’s not your twin—he’s you. He’s just as intent on your privacy as you are, because it’s his privacy too.

As you look over at the guy who used to be Bob and watch him freak out that he’s in Bob’s body now instead of his own, you wonder, “Why did I stay in my body and not wake up in Bob’s? Both brain halves are me, so why am I distinctly in my body and not seeing and thinking in dual split-screen right now, from both of our points of view? And whatever part of me is in Bob’s head, why did I lose touch with it? Who is the me in Bob’s head, and how did he end up over there while I stayed here?”

Brain Theory is shitting his pants right now—it makes no sense. If people are supposed to go wherever their brains go, what happens when a brain is in two places at once? Data Theory, who was badly embarrassed by the teletransporter experiment, is doing no better in this one.

But Body Theory—who was shot down at the very beginning of the post—is suddenly all smug and thrilled with himself. Body Theory says “Of course you woke up in your own body—your body is what makes you you. Your brain is just the tool your body uses to think. Bob isn’t you—he’s Bob. He’s just now a Bob who has your thoughts and personality. There’s nothing Bob’s body can ever do to not be Bob.” This would help explain why you stayed in your body.

So a nice boost for Body Theory, but let’s take a look at a couple more things—

What we learned in the teletransporter experiment is that if your brain data is transferred to someone else’s brain, even if that person is molecularly identical to you, all it does is create a replica of you—a total stranger who happens to be just like you. There’s something distinct about Boston you that was important. When you were recreated out of different atoms in London, something critical was lost—something that made you you.

Body Theory (and Brain Theory) would point out that the only difference between Boston you and London you was that London you was made out of different atoms. London you’s body was like your body, but it was still made of different material. So is that it? Could Body Theory explain this too?

Let’s put it through two tests:

The Cell Replacement Test

Imagine I replace a cell in your arm with an identical, but foreign, replica cell. Are you not you anymore? Of course you are. But how about if, one at a time, I replace 1% of your cells with replicas? How about 10%? 30%? 60%? The London you was composed of 100% replacement cells, and we decided that that was not you—so when does the “crossover” happen? How many of your cells do we need to swap out for replicas before you “die” and what’s remaining becomes your replica?

Something feels off with this, right? Considering that the cells we’re replacing are molecularly identical to those we’re removing, and someone watching this all happen wouldn’t even notice anything change about you, it seem implausible that you’d ever die during this process, even if we eventually replaced 100% of your cells with replicas. But if your cells are eventually all replicas, how are you any different from London you?

The Body Scattering Test 

Imagine going into an Atom Scattering Chamber that completely disassembles your body’s atoms so that all that’s left in the room is a light gas of floating atoms—and then a few minutes later, it perfectly reassembles the atoms into you, and you walk out feeling totally normal.

disassemble

Is that still you? Or did you die when you were disassembled and what has been reassembled is a replica of you? It doesn’t really make sense that this reassembled you would be the real you and London you would be a replica, when the only difference between the two cases is that the scattering room preserves your exact atoms and the London chamber assembles you out of different atoms. At their most basic level, atoms are identical—a hydrogen atom from your body is identical in every way to a hydrogen atom in London. Given that, I’d say that if we’re deciding London you is not you, then reassembled you is probably not you either.

The first thing these two tests illustrate is that the key distinction between Boston you and London you isn’t about the presence or absence of your actual, physical cells. The Cell Replacement Test suggests that you can gradually replace much or all of your body with replica material and still be you, and the Body Scattering Test suggests that you can go through a scatter and a reassembly, even with all of your original physical material, and be no more you than the you in London. Not looking great for Body Theory anymore.

The second thing these tests reveal is that the difference between Boston and London you might not be the nature of the particular atoms or cells involved, but about continuity. The Cell Replacement Test might have left you intact because it changed you gradually, one cell at a time. And if the Body Scattering Test were the end of you, maybe it’s because it happened all at the same time, breaking the continuity of you. This could also explain why the teletransporter might be a murder machine—London you has no continuity with your previous life.

So could it be that we’ve been off the whole time pitting the brain, the body, and the personality and memories against each other? Could it be that anytime you relocate your brain, or disassemble your atoms all at once, transfer your brain data onto a new brain, etc., you lose you because maybe, you’re not defined by any of these things on their own, but rather by a long and unbroken string of continuous existence?

Continuity

A few years ago, my late grandfather, in his 90s and suffering from dementia, pointed at a picture on the wall of himself as a six-year-old. “That’s me!” he explained.

He was right. But come on. It seems ridiculous that the six-year-old in the picture and the extremely old man standing next to me could be the same person. Those two people had nothing in common. Physically, they were vastly different—almost every cell in the six-year-old’s body died decades ago. As far as their personalities—we can agree that they wouldn’t have been friends. And they shared almost no common brain data at all. Any 90-year-old man on the street is much more similar to my grandfather than that six-year-old.

But remember—maybe it’s not about similarity, but about continuity. If similarity were enough to define you, Boston you and London you, who are identical, would be the same person. The thing that my grandfather shared with the six-year-old in the picture is something he shared with no one else on Earth—they were connected to each other by a long, unbroken string of continuous existence. As an old man, he may not know anything about that six-year-old boy, but he knows something about himself as an 89-year-old, and that 89-year-old might know a bunch about himself as an 85-year-old. As a 50-year-old, he knew a ton about him as a 43-year-old, and when he was seven, he was a pro on himself as a 6-year-old. It’s a long chain of overlapping memories, personality traits, and physical characteristics.

It’s like having an old wooden boat. You may have repaired it hundreds of times over the years, replacing wood chip after wood chip, until one day, you realize that not one piece of material from the original boat is still part of it. So is that still your boat? If you named your boat Polly the day you bought it, would you change the name now? It would still be Polly, right?

In this way, what you are is not really a thing as much as a story, or a progression, or one particular theme of person. You’re a bit like a room with a bunch of things in it—some old, some new, some you’re aware of, some you aren’t—but the room is always changing, never exactly the same from week to week.

Likewise, you’re not a set of brain data, you’re a particular database whose contents are constantly changing, growing, and being updated. And you’re not a physical body of atoms, you’re a set of instructions on how to deal with and organize the atoms that bump into you.

People always say the word soul and I never really know what they’re talking about. To me, the word soul has always seemed like a poetic euphemism for a part of the brain that feels very inner to us; or an attempt to give humans more dignity than just being primal biological organisms; or a way to declare that we’re eternal. But maybe when people say the word soul what they’re talking about is whatever it is that connects my 90-year-old grandfather to the boy in the picture. As his cells and memories come and go, as every wood chip in his canoe changes again and again, maybe the single common thread that ties it all together is his soul. After examining a human from every physical and mental angle throughout the post, maybe the answer this whole time has been the much less tangible Soul Theory.

______

It would have been pleasant to end the post there, but I just can’t do it, because I can’t quite believe in souls.

The way I actually feel right now is completely off-balance. Spending a week thinking about clones of yourself, imagining sharing your brain or merging yours with someone else’s, and wondering whether you secretly die every time you sleep and wake up as a replica will do that to you. If you’re looking for a satisfying conclusion, I’ll direct you to the sources below since I don’t even know who I am right now.

The only thing I’ll say is that I told someone about the topic I was posting on for this week, and their question was, “That’s cool, but what’s the point of trying to figure this out?” While researching, I came across this quote by Parfit: “The early Buddhist view is that much or most of the misery of human life resulted from the false view of self.” I think that’s probably very true, and that’s the point of thinking about this topic.

___________

Related Wait But Why Posts
– Here’s how I’m working on this false view of self thing.
– And things could get even more confusing soon when we have to figure out if Artificial Superintelligence is conscious or not.

Sources
Very few of the ideas or thought experiments in this post are my original thinking. I read and listened to a bunch of personal identity philosophy this week and gathered my favorite parts together for the post. The two sources I drew from the most were philosopher Derek Parfit’s book Reasons and Persons and Yale professor Shelly Kagan’s fascinating philosophy course on death—the lectures are all watchable online for free.

Other Sources:
David Hume: Hume on Identity Over Time and Persons
Derek Parfit: We Are Not Human Beings
Peter Van Inwagen: Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity
Bernard Williams: The Self and the Future
John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Chapter: Of Identity and Diversity)
Douglas Hofstadter: Gödel, Escher, Bach
Patrick Bailey: Concerning Theories of Personal Identity

And a fascinating and related video
For a while now, my favorite YouTube channel has been Kurzgesagt. They make one amazing five-minute animated video a month on the exact kinds of topics I love to write about. I highly recommend subscribing. Anyway, I’ve spoken to them and we liked the idea of tag-teaming a similar topic at the same time, and since this one was on both of our lists, we did that this week. I focused on what the self is, they explored what life itself is. Check it out:

 

Vida ou Não-Vida Após a Morte: Incrivel Nova Tese Nasce Dentro da Matrix/DNA: Seríamos A Dualidade Onda/Particula Em Evolutivo Feed-Back: Guidance Wave Theory

quinta-feira, março 19th, 2015

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Capitulo Contendo Coleções de Dados Sobre a Categoria “Vida ou Não-Vida Após a Morte?”

Esta nova teoria denominada Guidance Wave Theory de Ian Miller bate surpreendentemente com os resultados sendo sugeridos pela Matrix/DNA Theory sobre o que acontece na morte de um corpo humano. Veja meu comentário explicando como, a seguir:

Life after death

https://ianmillerblog.wordpress.com/2015/02/04/life-after-death/

ian miller blog

Meu Comentario ( a ser traduzido para português) ( Não Publicado, aguardando moderação):

A Vida Após a Morte Pode ser Explicada pela Dualidade Onda/Partícula. Cada corpo humano individual representa os aspectos “onda” e  “partícula”.  Partícula é seu aspecto corpo material visível, é sua posição em relação ao espaço, e onda em relação ao tempo é um aspecto invisível a nós, pois não vemos e não podemos tocar o tempo. Como partícula ela não se limita a um corpo individual ( o qual é apenas uma micro-cópia, um fractal da partícula) , ela se completa como o coletivo dos indivíduos, ou seja, a espécie. E espécies podem desaparecerem para sempre ou serem transformadas em novas formas, outras espécies. A espécie humana vem de uma linhagem evolutiva de um único sistema natural que se originou no Big Bang na sua mais simples forma e até o presente momento sempre foi transformado, ou seja, como partícula e no coletivo, ela nunca morreu.

No seu aspecto de onda do tempo, cada corpo humano no  seu tempo de existência é apenas um infinitesimal tempo do tempo total deste sistema sob evolução, ou seja, do tempo universal de 13,7 bilhões de anos. Isto quer dizer que na morte de um corpo a onda universal jamais morre ali. Em outras palavras, não existe vida após a morte porque simplesmente, na verdade, não existe “morte”.

We are arriving to same theoretical results coming from two different methods ( mine is comparative anatomy between living and nonliving natural systems). My theory called “Matrix/DNA, the universal formula for all natural systems and life’s cycles”, suggests that a unique body under the process of life’s cycle is at same time a wave and a particle. The particle is any momentum of that body and the wave is the lifelong time of that body. It happens that our DNA, which is the essence of every life’s species is merely the terrestrial biological shape of a universal essence, which I am calling “Matrix”. This result from my method is due when extracting the circuit flow connecting all parts of a system we get a formula in shape of computational diagram and it is equal from atoms to galaxies to plants cells to human brain’s configuration. Again, this universal formula coming within a system that emerged at the Big Bang and today is acquiring the shape of human brain and possibly also the shape of a new system called consciousness, is the universal Matrix/DNA.

So, it means that each momentum state of this unique universal system is a particle and this particle had appeared as several individuals which dies, but the particle’s shape continues to existing as the collective, called “species”. It is the particle as collective that is evolutionary transformed into new more complex systems. As sample we have an analogy with the individual human body, which could be called “particle” and we know that this particle under the process of life’s cycle is transformed into several shapes, from blastula to fetus to teenager, etc.  So, an individual body-particle dies, but the collective of this body particles does not: it is transformed. It means that this universal system-particle called human body is 13, 7 billion years old, like the Matrix/DNA.

But… the formula is showing that the body which is a system is seen by us as particle at a given moment of its lifelong, while we can not see its time running at that moment because the time or life’s cycle force is a wave. Since that there is a unique natural system evolving under the process of life’s cycle since the Big Bang to today consciousness, it means that there is a unique wave of time and it is 13,7 billion years old. It means that when a body-system-particle disappears as individual, the wave does not disappear because it is the collective of all individuals and it will continuing the evolution, certainly to the next transcendental or more complex shape of this universal system.

My method lead me to a new interpretation of the electromagnetic spectrum of light waves. From gamma ray to radio, all different states of frequencies/vibrations/colors are equal the sequence of transformations of the state of energy/vibration of a unique human body, from fetus to adult. It means that also a light wave is under the process of life’s cycle… in another words, a light wave is the most simplest “living thing”. So simplest that it goes back to the extreme singularity at the initial moments of the Universe… or, beyond it. It means that the Universal Matrix, which today and here is encrypted into the biological DNA, and is the formula organizing the brain and consciousness, was existing before this Universe in shape of light. If consciousness is the final end of this evolution, it must be returning to be the initial light. Again, as light, it is a wave.

Declarations like the famous neuroscientist that had a left hemisphere stroke and saw everything as light without separation between her body and the external world are good evidences that this theory about the consciousness being a kind of light waves the survives after death is in the right track. Congratulations Mr.Ian: you had an astonishing insight. (sorry by the English language errors and you can see the Matrix/DNA formula at its website).

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( Artigo copiado aqui para ser traduzido)

The issue of whether there is life, or consciousness, after death is one of those questions that can only be answered by dying. If there is, you find out. My wife was convinced there is, and she was equally convinced that I, as a scientist, would quietly argue the concept was ridiculous. However, as she was dying of metastatic cancer we had a discussion of this issue, and I believe the following theory gave her considerable comfort. Accordingly, I announced this at her recent funeral, in case it helped anyone else, and I have received a number of requests to post the argument. I am doing two posts: one with the mathematics, and one where I merely assert the argument for those who want a simpler account. The more mathematical post is at (http://my.rsc.org/blogs/84/1561 ).

First, is there any evidence at all? There are numerous accounts of people who nearly die but do not, and they claim to see a tunnel of light, and relations at the other end. There are two possible explanations:
(1) What they see is true,
(2) When the brain shuts down, it produces these illusions.
The problem with (2) is, why does it do it the same way for all? There was also an account recently of someone who died on an operating table, but was resuscitated, and he then gave an account of what the surgeons were doing as viewed from above. The following study may be of interest (http://rt.com/news/195056-life-after-death-study/ ) One can take this however one likes, but it is certainly weird.

What I told Claire arises from my interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is significantly different from most others’. First, some background. (If you have no interest in physics, you can skip this and go to the last three paragraphs.) If you fire particles such as electrons one at a time through a screen with two slits, each electron will give a point reading on a detector screen, but if you do this for long enough, the points give the pattern of wave diffraction. This is known as wave-particle duality, and at the quantum level, an experiment either gives properties of a particle or those consistent with a wave, depending on how you do it. So, how is that explained? Either there is a wave guiding the particles or there is not. Most physicists argue there is not and the electrons just happen to give that distribution. You ask, why? They tend to say, “Shut up and compute!” Einstein did not agree, and said, “God does not play dice.” What we know is that computations based on a wave equation give remarkably good agreement with observation, but nobody can find evidence for the wave. All we detect are the particles, but of course that is what the detectors are set up to detect. It is generally agreed that the formalism that enables calculations is sufficient. For me, that is not sufficient, and I think there must be something causing this behaviour. Suppose you cannot see ducks but you here a lot of quacking, why do you assume the quacks are just the consequence of your listening, and there are no ducks? There is a minority who believe there is a wave, and the pilot wave concept was formed by de Broglie.

Modern physics states the wave function is complex. In general, this is true, but from Euler’s theory of complex numbers, once (or twice) a period (which is defined as the time from one crest, say, to the next) the wave becomes momentarily real. My first premise is
The physics of the system are determined only when the wave becomes real.
From this, the stability of atoms, the Uncertainty Principle and the Exclusion Principle follow. Not that that is of importance here, other than to note that this interpretation does manage to do what standard theory effectively has as premises. My next premise is
The wave causes the wave behaviour.
At first sight, this seems obvious, but recall that modern quantum theory does not assert this. Now, if so, it follows that the wave front must travel at the same velocity as the particle; if it did not, how could it affect the particle? But if it travels at the same velocity, the energy of the system must be twice the kinetic energy of the particle. This simply asserts that the wave transmits energy. Actually, every other wave in physics transmits energy, except for the textbook quantal matter wave, which transmits nothing, it does not exist, but it defines probabilities. (As an aside, since energy is proportional to mass, in general this interpretation does not conflict with standard quantum mechanics.) For this discussion, the most important consequence is that both particle and wave must maintain the same energy. The wave sets the particle energy because the wave is deterministic, which means that once the wave is defined, it is defined for every future with known conditions. The particle, however, suffers random motion and has to be guided by the wave in my theory.

Now, what is consciousness? Strictly speaking, we do not know exactly, but examination of brains that are conscious appear to show considerable ordered electrical activity. But if electrical activity is occurring, that is the expenditure of energy. (The brain uses a remarkably high fraction of the body’s energy.) But since the movement of electrons is quantum controlled, then the corresponding energy must be found in an associated set of waves. Moreover, it is the associated wave that is causal, and it alone can overcome the randomness that may arise through the uncertainty of position of any particle. The wave guides the particle! Another important feature of these Guidance Waves is they are linear, which means they are completely separable. This is a general property of waves, and is not an ad hoc addition. It therefore follows that when we are conscious and living “here”, there is a matrix of waves with corresponding energy “there”.

Accordingly, if this Guidance Wave interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, then the condition for life after death is very simple: death occurs because the body cannot supply the energy required to match the Guidance Waves that are organizing consciousness, and the random motion of particles in the brain, due to heat, overpower the order that bodily consciousness requires. The body now is no longer conscious, and hence is dead, and useful brain activity ceases. But if at the point where the brain can no longer provide its energy contribution for consciousness, the energy within the Guidance Wave can dissociate itself from the body and maintain itself “there”, and recall that the principle of linearity is that other waves do not affect it, then that wave package can continue, and since it represents the consciousness of a person, that consciousness continues. What happens next depends on the conditions applicable “there”, and for that we have no observations.

Is the Guidance Wave interpretation correct? As far as I am aware, there is no observation that would falsify my alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics, while my Guidance Wave theory does make two experimental predictions that contradict standard quantum mechanics. It also greatly simplifies the calculation of some chemical bond properties. However, even if it is correct, that does not mean there is life after death, but at least in my interpretation of quantum mechanics it is permitted. That thought comforted Claire in her last days, and if it comforts anyone else, this post is worth it.

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Outro excelente artigo e posterior comentários com muitos links sobre o tópico:

Near death, explained

New science is shedding light on what really happens during out-of-body experiences — with shocking results.

http://www.salon.com/2012/04/21/near_death_explained/

( E como resposta ateísta de PZ Myers, ver:

Near-death, distorted

Taking aim at a recent Salon story about the science of out-of-body experiences

http://www.salon.com/2012/04/26/near_death_distorted/