Archive for agosto 5th, 2017

Biologia Holistica: Novo termo técnico na direcao do pensamento sistemico

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


“Although he believes “the time of explaining through radical reduction is over,” he acknowledged few biologists seemed ready to accept the more holistic “new biology.”

O texto acima, obtido no link abaixo, e’ de um artigo onde criacionistas estao achando que novidades da biologia moderna, como a epigenetica, e’ uma oportunudade para a religiao voltar `a arena cientifica depois de ter sido expulsa pelo reducionismo materialista. Mas abaixo vai tambem um link para o Pharyngula sobre a critica do PZ Myers a esta esperanca criacionista ( e tambem a copia de meu comentario).

Pharyngula: The atheist dilemma

E meu comentario que enviei para o Pharyngula mas parece que nao foi publicado ainda:

( usei conta do Google+, em 8/05/2017)

Reductionism have guided humans to a wrong world view because it hiddens the natural hierarchy of systems. Systems like a cell are made of systems that are made of systems while cells are inside systems that are inside systems, allways up and down. So, any system is influenced by its sub-systems and by the systems it is inside.
The big problem is that all these systems are actually, derived shapes of a unique universal system. Which makes its different shapes, sizes, complexity, etc., is that this universal system is under evolution, and it obeys the process of life’s cycles. Like human bodies shows different shapes in a lifetime due this process. You know that the shape of a baby will have total influence in modelling the shape of the adult,… If you do not consider it, you will be not able to understand the full mechanisms and processes of the past evolution that leads to the adult. here is the big problem with the reductionist mindset and world view.
Cells contains atoms systems and are inside galactic systems. These systems are the same cell, before and after, down and up. Medicine is still struggling around the millenar mortal diseases, genes behavior remains complicated, we don’t get the health syncronization with our nature, etc. Epigenetics, hollistic biology as systems biology, all of systemic thought is our future, and this not will lead us to magical gods….


Naturalismo,… não existe? (Vídeo criacionista)

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


Ver video:

“Why there is no such thing as Naturalism” – HOWARD ROBINSON

Meus modelos teoricos podem ser provados serem não-realistas? Conferencia em Outubro

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


Fazer uma pesquisa sobre estas areas e termos tecnicos que eu desconheco sobre a construcao de modelos. E ver se consigo o registro da conferencia

What to make of highly unrealistic models?

Conferencia: October 12, 2017 – October 13, 2017

Local: Helsinky, Finlandia

Workshop 12-13 OCTOBER 2017

TINT Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of Social Sciences University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

What to make of highly unrealistic models? This is one of the big questions in contemporary philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of economics and biology.

Two sets of issues are relevant to answering this question. The first has to do with the ways in which highly unrealistic models should be characterized and the numerous ways in which models can be unrealistic. The key concepts here include those of representation and target, truth and falsity, abstraction and isolation, idealization and simplification, etc. Recent literature on models exhibits conceptual and terminological diversity and disagreement in characterizing unrealistic models. Different authors use different names to refer to highly unrealistic models: ‘toy model’, ‘fictional model’, ‘minimal model’, ‘non-representative model’, ‘model without a target’, ‘substitute model’, etc. Moreover, they sometimes use the same name to refer to different types of models. Neither the precise meanings nor the relations between these notions are clear in the literature.

The second set of issues has to do with the functions and uses of such unrealistic models. What purposes can they serve, and what purposes are actually pursued when using them? The main body of literature points to representational quality as grounding explanatory capacity despite abstraction, isolation, simplification and idealization. Others dispute this idea. Moreover, highly unrealistic models can serve other possible functions, next to their explanatory uses. Debates concerning the appropriate uses of highly unrealistic models need some tidying up.

TINT will host a workshop in Helsinki on 12-13 October 2017 in order to sort out some of the ambiguities and confusions in the literature and to contribute to a better understanding of the interpretations and uses of highly abstract and idealizing models. We are particularly interested in papers that (i) clarify the meaning of commonly used terms such as toy model, minimal model, fictional model, substitute model, etc, and that (ii) clarify the arguments for and against such models having explanatory import or some other epistemic or non-epistemic function. Papers that focus on and compare highly unrealistic models in economics and biology are particularly welcome.

If you would like to join us please send an extended abstract (750 – 1000 words) before 15 August 2017 to N. Emrah Aydinonat ( We plan to publish a selection of papers from the symposium as a journal’s special issue. For this reason, authors accepted for the workshop are required to submit an extended summary of their argument (2000 – 2500 words) before the event. Extended summaries will be distributed to all participants in advance. The workshop will consist of short presentations followed by extensive discussion.

Filosofos: Como Interessar o Publico no Seu Tema?

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


Why Philosophers Fail to Influence Public Debate—and How They Can Do Better

We all know that philosophers are expert thinkers but most philosophers, and especially moral philosophers, want to change the world as well. As Plato noted, once one has ascended to the pinnacle of wisdom, or at least successfully defended a PhD thesis, it is hard to resist the temptation to come back down again and help to spread the light to others.

However, for most of us, the idea of actually succeeding at this is little more than a dream. Attempts to get heard often end up backfiring or simply proving a waste of time and energy. Even philosophers whose work is in areas of real public interest, such as applied ethics, can struggle to get a hearing above the noise of pundits, preachers and politicians whose views, though ill-considered and even inconsistent, are far easier on the ear and offer people a sense of certainty in a baffling world.

At a recent workshop on Personal Identity and Public Policy held at Oxford, we considered what to do about this problem. Our shared interest was in what makes people – well, people. In particular, what makes me the same person when I am young as when I am old. The answer to this question is vital to many issues, from health care to criminal justice, emerging technologies to the diagnosis of death. However, these are often issues on which people, including doctors, lawyers and scientists, have already made up their minds. So why should anyone care what philosophers think about them?

Whose problems are these anyway?

Here’s an example. Should people be punished for crimes they committed in the distant past? It seems pretty obvious that we should only punish a person for a crime if we are reasonably convinced that they are the same person who committed that crime. However, on many views of personal identity, once enough time has passed between the commission of the offence and the punishment, then, even if the criminal is still alive, they will no longer be the same person that they were and so could not deserve punishment.

One critical issue for philosophers is that having considered a problem like this for many years, we tend to think about it in fundamentally different ways to people coming to it for the first time. For us, there is nothing wrong with asking questions such as ‘is there really a moral distinction between punishing somebody many years after they have committed a crime, and punishing someone who never committed any crimes to begin with’. However, for many people such questions appear heretical at best and incomprehensible at worst.

Therefore, before we can hope to engage in genuine public debate, and still be taken seriously, we need to find ways of addressing problems that people actually have. To articulate views in a way that can have an impact it is necessary that they are located within an area of debate for which their relevance is clear and easy to understand. Furthermore, while philosophers like to deal with arguments and arguments alone, most non-philosophers deal mainly in conclusions. A view, no matter how well expressed and cogent it may be, whose implications are unclear or unacceptable to a mass audience may well be worth pursuing academically, but will not be of wider interest – at least not without a lot of hard work.

So, while, for philosophers, there is a simple matter of principle here, there is no chance of making any progress unless we recognise that the conclusion that rapists and murders should avoid being convicted of their crimes is probably a step too far. Best then to restrict oneself, at least in the early stages, to cases in which our conclusions appear less outrageous – for instance to crimes that depended more upon the identity of the criminal to begin with, such as fraud or conspiracy.

Making friends – in high places

The next problem philosophers face is that, much as we hate to admit it, we don’t have all the answers. Getting moral philosophy right is an important part of good decision making, but it is only one part. Public debates, however, tend to focus on a whole package, means, motivation and opportunity, and if philosophers cannot find ways of speaking to all these things our opinions will only ever play a marginal role.

A first question is whether philosophers tend to agree amongst themselves. Let’s return to the issue of criminal responsibility. As I mentioned earlier, some scholars take the view that one is simply not the same person in one’s old age as in one’s youth, one is merely a ‘successor self’. This view tends to be supported by those who believe that personal identity over time is a matter of ‘psychological continuity’, the degree to which our memories, intentions, beliefs, desires and personality traits vary over time. Given enough time almost all of us change psychologically, so philosophers who take this view find it easy to conclude that, in at least some cases, it is morally wrong to punish somebody for crimes from their distant past.

What of philosophers who do not share this view? The main alternative is ‘animalism’, the idea that personal identity consists in being the same biological organism over time. On this view, it is almost impossible, barring certain radical medical interventions, that somebody is not the same person in their old age as they were in their youth. However, many who take this view find, as a result, that personal identity over time is not so morally significant as we might think. Sure, punishing somebody for a historical offence is not the same thing as punishing an entirely different person, but why should their continuity as a biological organism matter to us when so many other morally interesting facts about them, such as their personality and behaviour, might have changed? So at least amongst philosophers, there is broad agreement about the conclusion that we should often not punish people for historical offences, even though there is less agreement on why this is so.

Building bridges outside of philosophy can be more difficult. While philosophers often find common ground with certain others groups, such as psychologists, sociologists and even criminologists, others who may have more of an impact on public debate, like economists and lawyers, have very well-defined conventions and norms.

It is invariably easier to influence a debate when someone is already interested in what you have to say, (procurar o publico certo), and more people are going to be interested in what philosophers have to say if this can easily express it in terms that are relevant to them and carry clear implications for the kinds of decisions they face. Often, it is only in trying to engage others that we find people who are prepared to listen and, through talking with them, find better ways to tell them what you have to say.

Getting one’s hands dirty

So, if philosophy is to live the dream of influencing public debate then philosophers must think a lot more about what we are saying, how we are saying it, who we are saying it to and why they might care. However, there is still one more thing that needs to be done, the hard bit, actually getting out there and saying it. This leaves philosophers with probably the biggest problem of all, where to start.

Is it better to write a book and become the ‘go-to academic’ on an issue in the hope that people will come and ask you about it, to talk to relevant policymakers and find out what they most want to hear or to take to the streets and shout at the top of one’s voice? Of course, this is not a question that can be answered once and for all. However, one useful proposal is often to find those people who one can influence most easily and who carry most influence over others. If this is a well-informed general public, then write a book, or better yet a series of blog posts. If it is a small group of specialist policy makers then go to them directly – sometimes it can be surprising how interested they can be (especially if they took a class or two in philosophy at university). Finally, however, if what one has to say is too big and too important to be left for others to help communicate it, then it’s probably time to get behind those barricades.

Anyone care to join us?

Materialismo darwinista x Biologia Quantica – Video

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017



Humor na Matrix: Inventado o Pipi-Tampão.

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


So faltava essa! Para aqueles que reclamam que sexo com camisinha nao ‘e tao bom, inventaram uma nova ideia.

So nao inventaram algo para evitar pipi-explosoes…

Interessado? Segue os links, inclusive para um artigo do PZ Myers:

Jen Gunter doesn’t just do vaginas


Filantropia, Fundos para Pesquisas

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


Oldest evidence of life on land found in 3.48-billion-year-old Australian rocks

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


Ver artigo:

The origin of life: a critique of current scientific models

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


Ler artigo:


Efeitos da Quântica Interferem na Biologia? Vídeo.

sábado, agosto 5th, 2017


Ver video: