Matrix/DNA Website: 10 Anos Caminhando Lado a Lado com a Ciencia (2008-2018)

outubro 9th, 2017

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Matrix/DNA Website: 10 Anos Caminhando com a Ciencia

Matrix/DNA Website: 10 Anos Caminhando com a Ciencia (2008-2018)

E milhoes de visitantes agora sabem da nossa existencia. Uma nova visao do mundo, um novo e sublime significado para nossa existencia, uma mensagem de uniao inteligente, o sonho de deixar aos jovens um mundo melhor do que recebemos, uma instropeccao para testar sua correcao, uma luta por espaco, porque as visoes ocupando espacos nao deram certo…

Um Hino as potencias do homem, da mulher, do jovem, da crianca,… um brado retumbante:

“Voce pode! Nos Podemos! Vamos la’…”

Filosofia, contemporanea: The Philosophers Magazine

outubro 8th, 2017

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http://www.philosophersmag.com/

Esperar resultado ( do governo) em 10/out. Se positive, completar subscricao (U$ 6,00 ) e ler primeiro o artigo sobre a a Natureza da Vida…

Quer ser Bom em Filosofia? Estude Ciencias e Matematica

outubro 7th, 2017

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Porque esta tendencia do homem moderno para a matematica, enquanto a minha tendencia e’ se afastar dela? A matematica e’ a logica e a linguagem da organizacao da materia por processos mecanicos. Entao esta explicado: deixando-se conduzir pela natureza imediata, devido ao intelecto e conciencia ainda embrionarios, fracos, o homem deixa-se ser a reproducao desta maquina celeste que se impoe e impede a ascencao das organizacoes biologicas e neurologicas da material, as quais dominam meu intelecto.

Mas nao adianta eu ficar falando de outras dimensoes influents em nossas vidas e ambiente enquanto o resto dos humanos so podem captar a dimensao iluminada pela luz visivel. Tenho que estudar a logica e linguagem deles para saber como puxa-las para estas dimensoes. Entao,… vamos la’… 

Want to Be Good at Philosophy? Study Maths and Science

http://www.philosophersmag.com/essays/131-want-to-be-good-at-philosophy-study-maths-and-science

( Limpar o google, puxar este link no google, copiar o artigo sem os defeitos do edge, delectar esta copia abaixo, e traduzi-lo)

” One key role for philosophers is to help science ask the right questions and make contextual sense out of the answers it obtains.”

” In On the Origin of Species, for example, there are no equations, but it abounds with observations and inferences.”

(Spinoza, Descartes and others, for example, are known for using the “Geometric Method” in philosophy.) > Pesquisar “geometric method”

Peter Boghossian and James Lindsay argue that philosophers must be scientifically informed.

If you want to be a good philosopher, don’t rely on intuition or comfort. Study maths and science. They’ll allow you access the best methods we have for knowing the world while teaching you to think clearly and analytically. Mathematics is the philosophical language nature prefers, and science is the only truly effective means we have for connecting our philosophy to reality. Thus maths and science are crucial for good philosophy – for getting things right.

Truth is not always intuitive or comfortable. As a quirk of our base-ten number system, for example, the number 0.999…, the one that is an infinite concatenation of nines, happens to equal 1. That is, 0.999… is 1, and the two expressions, 0.999… and 1, are simply two ways to express the same thing. The proofs of this fact are numerous, easy, and accessible to people without a background in mathematics (the easiest being to add one third, 0.333…, to two thirds, 0.666…, and see what you get). This result isn’t intuitive, and – as anyone who has taught it can attest – not everyone is comfortable with it at first blush.

The sciences, which were largely born out of philosophy, are also replete with nonintuitive, and even uncomfortable truths. The most extreme examples of this are found in quantum mechanics, with interpretations of double slit experiments, quantum entanglement, and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle confounding essentially everyone. But even sciences investigating scales more familiar to us, like biological evolution, are nonintuitive and uncomfortable to the point of being rejected by surprising numbers of people despite overwhelming scientific consensus spanning nearly a century and a half.

Thinking philosophically requires the capacity to logically and rigorously engage ideas and then either accept the results or reject our assumptions – no matter how nonintuitive or how uncomfortable those assumptions may be. Mathematics is an ideal tool for teaching this as it is deeply abstract and simplifies reality nearly to the point of ignoring it. This does not mean that mathematics qua mathematics is always important for good philosophy, though it certainly can be. It does mean that learning to organise, think, and denote like a mathematician reaps enormous benefits for clear philosophical thought. Philosophers who can think like mathematicians are better at clear thinking, and thus philosophy.

For instance, consider the application of basic set theory to linguistics. Set-theoretic thinking – particularly, the applications of subset relations, intersections and unions, set inclusion, and even the relevant mathematical notation to modifiers such as adjectives, adverbs, and participial phrases – has proven fruitful in helping linguists clarify the relationships between words and the classes of ideas they represent. This application has allowed a more precise, deeper understanding of the ways that different uses of words create meaning in sentences and thus a capacity for clearer and richer expressions of ideas, including philosophical propositions. It has done so despite the fact that linguistics is not nearly as mathematically dependent as fields like physics.

Even philosophical efforts on desperately difficult topics like ethics – the apparently subjective nature of which serves quite reasonably something of a cordon sanitaire against the intrusion of too much objective empiricism into the provinces of philosophy – benefit from the habits of mathematical thought. For example, take Sam Harris’s controversial 2010 contribution to the field in his bestselling book, The Moral Landscape. He argued for determining human values scientifically. The metaphorical moral landscape itself is most easily comprehended by picturing multidimensional topographies in which some measure of flourishing and suffering ranges in the vertical and peaks and troughs can be visualised as local maxima and minima. Further, Harris’s entire argument rests in part upon his ability to articulate an objective nadir, an absolute minimum, in that space – the maximum possible suffering of every sentient creature. The entire moral landscape can be thus thought of as a partially ordered set of moral positions together with their resultant consequences as measured on hypothetical metric related to well-being and suffering.

Of course, mathematics is most clearly applicable to philosophy where it intersects with the mathematically hard sciences, like physics. Much in physics, for example, depends upon clearly understanding the scope, power, and impact of Noether’s (first) theorem, named for Emmy Noether. Her theorem, proved a century ago and published in 1918, was truly revolutionary for physics because it completely changed how we understand conservation laws, revealing that conservation laws follow automatically from certain assumptions of invariance of physical laws (for example, if the laws of physics do not vary with locations in space, conservation of momentum automatically follows). Whether Noether’s theorem is best classified as a result in abstract mathematics or theoretical physics isn’t important, but that philosophers need to understand it is, at least if they want to work competently on ideas related to that which it pertains. Fully understanding and appreciating Noether’s theorem, however, requires a solid grasp of abstract algebra, at the least at an advanced undergraduate level. Cosmological metaphysicians don’t have much choice, then, but to learn enough mathematics to understand such ideas.

However, philosophy in general, and metaphysics in particular, isn’t as ‎puro‎ as mathematics because it must engage with the messiness of the world to help us ‎verificar‎ its truths. It therefore does not have the luxury of being purely abstract. Metaphysics attempts to extract truths about the world and articulate those truths in propositional format. It does this by examining the logical consequences of assumptions about reality which are based as closely as possible on reality, almost exactly like mathematics (counting and geometrical figures are empirical starting places for much of our mathematical reasoning) – and so metaphysics must begin with the recognition that the sciences are the only legitimate way to ‎gancho‎ our ideas to reality. Even a powerful result like Noether’s theorem is of no real application if we don’t have good, data-supported reasons to think that conservation laws apply to the universe. Metaphysical pursuits that become too tangential to the world by being ‎alheado‎ to science are little more than academic hobbyhorses.

One might contest that some branches of philosophy, like ethics, don’t need to articulate truths about the world, or even that no branch of philosophy does because the ‎alçada‎ of philosophy is inherently abstract. Whatever merit resides in this objection is lost to the fact that even if philosophy simply works out the logical consequences of various assumptions, the real-world worth of those assumptions comes down to being based upon observations of reality. Further, if philosophical inquiry is to have real-world significance – which has been the goal of every ethicist since Socrates – the results of one’s inquiry must be capable of being applied. Peter Singer’s eloquent adjurations against eating animals, for example, may be logical consequences of his assumptions, but both his assumptions and his conclusions are immediately tied to reality – don’t eat animals, a real applicable behaviour, because of the real suffering of real animals.

Moreover, the sub-disciplines of ethics in particular require tremendous insight into the nature of complicated real-world systems and a sincere willingness to revise beliefs in light of new discoveries – both of which are fostered by understanding science, the scientific methods, and the manner of scientific thought. Ethics plays out on the constrained system of human and other sentient psychology, which is a set of in-principle determinable facts about the world. (John Rawls, one of the most influential philosophers of the last century, explicitly acknowledged this in The Theory of Justice, as did Robert Nozick, one of Rawls’ principal detractors.) These facts are unlikely to be neat and clean in the same way as calculating ballistics for a rocket going to Jupiter, but they still represent a hypothetically knowable set of facts about the world. Poignantly, much within that set of facts is not arbitrary. Everything in that set depends entirely upon the realities of minds that perceive pain and pleasure, joy and despair, pity and schadenfreude. (Further, varied as we are, we’re not that varied, so normative statements are remarkably powerful, for all that they may miss in the particulars.) Ethicists, therefore, should be scientifically informed in multiple domains of thought, like psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and the particulars of any science applicable to their specific projects, such as medicine, biology, and genetics.

In having contributed to the development of the scientific method, philosophy can be said to be a cart that brought forth and hitched its own horse. It can hardly escape notice that both science and philosophy begrudge the hitching. Scientists, not unfairly, often criticise philosophers for making speculations that are untethered to reality and for failing to make substantive progress. Philosophers, not unfairly, tend to disparage scientists for a lack of philosophical savvy, whether that savvy is relevant to working in the sciences or not. Science, however, unambiguously gets exactly what philosophy is after: correct answers relevant to the world. At times, those correct answers are the desired outputs of the philosophical process, and at other times, they are necessary inputs since one key role for philosophers is to help science ask the right questions and make contextual sense out of the answers it obtains.

As a necessary result of this arrangement, no matter how much grumbling it stirs in the philosophically inclined, the fact is that good philosophy should be scientifically informed – the cart must be hitched to the horse to be of much use. Fortunately, the idea that philosophy should be more mathematical and scientific has a strong precedent in the history of the discipline. (Spinoza, Descartes and others, for example, are known for using the “Geometric Method” in philosophy.) And eminent philosophers recognize both the historical significance of maths and science on the discipline of philosophy and the consequences of its absence. Take, for instance, Daniel Dennett, who likened many philosophical projects to exploring the logical universes of a fictional and irrelevant variant on chess, and the harsher Peter Unger, whose Empty Ideas is devastating to enormous swaths of philosophical pursuit, especially those that are scientifically uninformed. If philosophy hopes to achieve its truth seeking epistemological and metaphysical ambitions, and thus have “abiding significance,” it must be rooted in science.

Still, just as good philosophers gain competence by being scientifically informed, good theoretical scientists gain competence by knowing more and deeper mathematics. This does not imply that all good science is heavily mathematical, as biology is a conspicuous example of good science that isn’t primarily mathematical. In On the Origin of Species, for example, there are no equations, but it abounds with observations and inferences. Even evolutionary biology, however, is deepened by the ideas in graph theory (the “tree of life,” for example), set-subset relationships (taxonomy), probability and combinatorics (gene inheritance), dynamic modelling (differential growth rates of populations to describe effects of environmental pressures, say as modelled by the Lotka-Volterra equations and others), stochastic processes (random variation of traits), and the combinatorial approach to thinking about DNA as “mathematical words” in a four-letter alphabet. No discipline is better than mathematics for tuning an intellect to think in such a manner.

Some may object that the onus to develop mathematical competence and habits of thought lays upon theoretical scientists more than on philosophers, but this sells short the capabilities of good philosophers and the demands of good philosophy. The lines that divide theoretical science and good philosophy of the sciences are both blurred and thin, and hence many branches of philosophy necessitate that philosophers are in fact theoreticians. In that case, just as theoretical scientists are ultimately beholden to the data, no matter the elegance of their models, so too are good philosophers. Therefore, it’s necessary that philosophers are scientifically informed and it would be worthwhile for philosophers to be mathematically adept.

When the conclusions of sound argumentation proceeding from evidence conflict with common sense, it should be the latter that we dismiss and not the former. Good philosophers don’t rely on intuition or comfort. They use maths and science to clarify and inform their philosophy. Maths helps hone skills of clear, rigorous thinking, and science is unparalleled at determining facts and explanatory theories describing reality. Maths and science are therefore crucial for philosophy to make contributions of enduring worth, and so those who wish to be good at philosophy should study both.

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Teorema de Noether: Matematica Necessaria aos Filosofos

Of course, mathematics is most clearly applicable to philosophy where it intersects with the mathematically hard sciences, like physics. Much in physics, for example, depends upon clearly understanding the scope, power, and impact of Noether’s (first) theorem, named for Emmy Noether. Her theorem, proved a century ago and published in 1918, was truly revolutionary for physics because it completely changed how we understand conservation laws, revealing that conservation laws follow automatically from certain assumptions of invariance of physical laws (for example, if the laws of physics do not vary with locations in space, conservation of momentum automatically follows). Whether Noether’s theorem is best classified as a result in abstract mathematics or theoretical physics isn’t important, but that philosophers need to understand it is, at least if they want to work competently on ideas related to that which it pertains. Fully understanding and appreciating Noether’s theorem, however, requires a solid grasp of abstract algebra, at the least at an advanced undergraduate level. Cosmological metaphysicians don’t have much choice, then, but to learn enough mathematics to understand such ideas

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Pesquisa:

Origem: Wikipédia

O teorema de Noether é um resultado da teoria de sistemas dinâmicos. A primeira versão do teorema foi demonstrada em 1918 por Emmy Noether.

Ela provou que toda grandeza física conservativa corresponde a um grupo contínuo de simetrias das equações. Simetria aqui é entendida como uma transformação matemática que deixa as equações inalteradas em sua essência, sendo que todas as simetrias possíveis formam um grupo (no sentido matemático do termo). Um grupo contínuo é um grupo de simetrias definidas por um número que pertence ao conjunto dos Reais.

Pesquisar “Algebra Abstrata”

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Pesquisar “geometric method”

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Inserir e pesquisar artigo do “Universo Racionalista” sobre o filósofo espanhol Jesus Mosterim (Musterim?), que foi lutador pela filosofia com base na ciência e tem muitos links para outros filósofos nesta linha… 

A morte pode ser anunciada pelo quarto quadrante da formula espiral da Matrix/DNA?

outubro 7th, 2017

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Esta quarta fase de declínio espiral imediatamente lembra a formula, na qual o circuito espiral também termina com a morte do sistema ( entre funções 7 e 1). Esta descoberta parece estar indicando que a o período de vida de uma pessoa é determinado pela velocidade com que o fluxo de energia corre no circuito. Se a velocidade for muito elevada, a pessoa vai morrer mais cedo, e assim os entrópicos sintomas das funções 6 e 7 começam a aparecer mais cedo na vida da pessoa do que o normal. E esta variação de velocidade lembra as velocidades dos giros no ciclo de Krebs, o qual, segundo o vídeo que estou assistindo, tem vários efeitos nos organismos a nível molecular. Precisamos reler e pesquisar isto, ver se foram publicados outros artigos com seção para comentários e ver a fonte original, o paper..

Death Spiral: 4th Phase of Life May Signal the End Is Near

https://www.livescience.com/55557-death-spiral-is-fourth-phase-of-life.html?utm_source=notification

 

As incriveis maquinas moleculares, foram criadas por Deus, pelo acaso, ou pelo metodo sugerido pela Matrix/DNA?

outubro 7th, 2017

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(corrigir o vocabulario digitado num teclado em ingles)

Apenas a Teoria da Matrix/DNA pode explicar um misterio realcionado `as maquinas moleculares dentro das celulas. Estas maquinas contem duzias, senao centenas de componentes. Mas diferente das maquinas feitas pelos homens – em que estes componentes sao montados e conectados em linhas de montagem – as maquinas biologicas precisam montarem-se a si proprias. E’ como se levassemos as pessas para montar um carro a uma fabrica e as pessas se movessem para a posicao certa e no exato momento delas entrarem no esquema. Pior ainda: isto significa que os ingredientes possuem em si o modelo da maquina a ser montada.

O professor e autor Michael Behe neste video alude a possibilidade de que tal proeza apenas pode ser indicativo de inteligente design… por Deus. Enquanto o materialismo nihilista que domina as academias escolares nao se preocupa mais com a causa do fenomeno pois se satisfaz descrevendo os movimentos do fenomeno, qualquer pessoa racional teria razao em se incomodar com tal fenomeno, pois nao se vislumbra uma explicacao racional para a causa dele. Mas uma pessoa racional nao se precipitaria tambem encerrando a questao imputando a causa a forsas sobrenaturais, quando nunca tais forsas foram detectadas empirica ou cientificamente.

Entao como fica o pobre racionalista?

Ao mesmo tempo, temos a oportunidade de ver este exato fenomeno ocorrendo em outro tempo e espaco. Me refiro `a montagem de uma maquina por si mesma – a dos organismos em embriogenese. Se vemos e sabemos como funciona, qual a causa, do mesmo fenomeno feito pela Natureza em outro lugar, porque nao concluir que as maquinas moleculares sejam montadas pelo mesmo processo? Entao no DNA existe o plano, o modelo da maquina, e de alguma forma ele dirige todas as operacoes de montagem. Em outras palavras, o modelo e as instrucoes para fazer a maquina vieram de uma causa que esta’ fora do pequeno universo  onde ocorre a embriogenese. Mas isto ainda nao resolve o problema, pois como e onde o DNA obteve este modelo, como foi montada a primeira maquina? Ora a mesma solucao deve ser transportada para este caso: o modelo e as instrucoes para fazer a primeira maquina vieram de fora do palco onde ocorreu abiogenesis, e inserida neste contexto dentro do DNA.

Os estudiosos normais nunca consideraram esta conclusao logica, porque, pela teoria que possuem do que era o mundo antes da abiogenesis, nao era possivel ter esta maquina em algum lugar. Mas o racionalismo, ao inves de ignorar a conclusao racional, devia suspeitar de sua teoria. Ate mesmo ignorar a sua teoria, pois ela se mostra irracional, se nela nao existe a previa maquina.

Foi isso o que fizemos e encontramos uma outra teoria racional que possui a previa maquina. Em outro capitulo aqui mostro com figuras e calculos como a maquinaria na producao do ATP e a maquina ciliar bacterial existia num sistema natural antes das origens da vida. Mas poderia persistir o problema de como o modelo da maquina previa teria sido transferido para o ambiente terrestre, e tambem poder-se-ia alegar que esta’ evidente que o Sistema previo nao esta’ presente na celula montando as pessas das maquinas. Ele pode transferir o modelo para fazer a maquina, mas nao teria como conduzir os componentes a aprenderem a se auto-organizarem por si mesmos.

O metodo pelo qual o Sistema previo transfeiru as instrucoes para as maquinas foi meramente o metodo genetico, tal como acontece na embriogenese. Mas existe uma diferenca sutil no metodo genetico em relacao a como se transferir de um Sistema para outro. Esta diferenca e’ imposta por uma outra lei ou processo natural que produz em toda evolucao de todos os sistemas uma divisao em duas fases – a primeira fase onde os ovos sao botados fora e a prole abandonada a propria sorte e a segunda fase onde os ovos passam a serem mantidos dentro e nutridos ate a maturacao do organismo. Pois o processo genetico de transmissao do Sistema previo – o qual e’ astronomico – refere-se ao processo evolucionario de primeira fase. isto acarreta em que os genes – ou bits-informacao – sejam emitidos do Sistema ao espaco sem estarem encerrados dentro de uma membrana, ou envelope cromossomico. Tal como ocorre com muitos seres marinhos que desovam nas aguas. Estes bits-informacao – provavelmente na forma de fotons – penetram os eletrons dos atomos e possuem a capacidade de perceberem seus semelhantes presentes em eletrons de atomos vizinhos, assim como os chineses imigrantes que chegam aos portos dos USA possuem a capacidade de se conectarem com seus conterraneos em Chinattowm.

Desta maneira os fotons comecam a se ligarem por sinapses formando iniciais networks das quais resultam os componentes destas maquinas. Depois os fotons residentes nestes componentes se conectam e se organizam na mesma ordem que estavam formando as maquinas no previo Sistema… e para nos parecera’ que a maquina se monta por si mesma.

No video abaixo, o momento que o autor cita este caso esta por volta de 48:20

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sspt5Bdmug

Teoria dos Modelos

outubro 7th, 2017

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Model Theory

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/

`A primeira vista, aconteceu com o conceito de “modelo” o mesmo que aconteceu com o conceito de sistemas. De repente deixaram o objeto real, o fato, para um lado e se entregaram a exercitar as abstracoes mentais sobe o fato ( Already by the late 17th century the word “model” could mean an object that shows the form, not of real-world objects, but of mathematical constructs. Leibniz boasted that he didn’t need models in order to do mathematics.)

Pode se ver isto nesta encyclopedia definindo teoria dos modelos. Ela inicia falando do que ‘e a teoria em matematica e so’ mais tarde retorna ao que realmente e’ modelo de fato.

Ler com mais tempo isto para conhecer a historia da evolucao do pensamento a respeito deste assunto:

 

Matemática: Porque não é a logica da Natureza

outubro 6th, 2017

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Muitos acadêmicos estão me cobrando a matemática que apliquei para desenvolver a Matrix/DNA Theory, alegando que sem matemática não tem valor cientifico. muitos não-acadêmicos mas intelectuais curiosos por Natureza ficam de olhos arregalados me perguntando de onde tirei estas ideias. ” Nunca houve origens da vida neste Universo”, ou ” não existe código genético”, ou na galaxia tem astros executando funções de machos e de fêmeas”, ou ” uma onda de luz contem o código da vida”, etc., realmente são frases nunca proferidas por outro ser humano. E nas explicações do porque destas frases, os ouvintes ficam boiando. E eu não tenho palavras para responder a resposta pois é algo relacionado ao funcionamento da psique que ainda não entendemos. Apenas sei dizer que os sete anos na selva me fez uma lavagem cerebral da cultura da civilização humana e neste estado regredido de mente vazia a selva com sua natureza bruta tratou de preenche-la. Eu não usei matemática, apenas me deitava na terra e ficava com os ouvidos colados nela tentando ouvi-la. Assim fiz com as arvores, com animais, a atmosfera, os rios e tudo o mais. Captei com o coração, não com a logica acadêmica. E como não tenho certeza se captei certo ou errado… fica tudo para o tempo responder a estes acadêmicos e intelectuais. Mas tenho a impressão que o mundo se explica por um segredo que não conhecemos ainda, e não pela logica matemática.

Vamos começar com um exemplo.

Desenhe uma esfera. Divida a esfera em 3 partes iguais. Para cada parte os humanos recorrem ao que eles inventaram e chamam de matemática, e dizem que vale 1/3, ou 0,333… Mas se você somar três vezes 1/3, obtém, 3/9. A esfera toda dizem que vale 1 inteiro. Ora, 3/9 não é 1. Ou então dizem que cada parte vale 0,333…. Some três vezes 0,333. Obtem 0.999…. O que não é 1.  Podes dizer que o pedacinho da esfera que ficou faltando vai aparecer quando você estender o numero, como 0,33333333… e por diante por todo o infinito. Não adianta, você sempre vai obter o 0,99999999…. Então, onde esta’ o pedacinho faltante?

Não tem pedacinho faltante, a Natureza não faz desaparecer pedacinhos no nada. Foi você que começou tudo errado, não a Natureza. Ela não fala matemática, não funciona pela logica matemática e não quer saber de matemática, ela é o que ela é, e a logica dela, ou ausência de logica alguma, não é a logica da matemática do cérebro humano.

Mas então como vamos resolver este problema de fazer 3 partes iguais ser igual a 1? Continuas errando. Ja disse que a Natureza, que é a inventora de esferas, não fala, não calcula com números e logica matemática. Você insistiu em dizer 3, 1, assim não vai a lugar algum. Tem que existir uma outra maneira de fazer o cérebro se sincronizar com a figura da esfera,  e com uma esfera dividida em 3… ( epa, olha eu escorregando na manteiga também), quer dizer, uma esfera dividida do jeito que você dividiu no desenho e exprimir isso com outro simbolo, outra logica que não matemática.

Um outro exemplo, se refere ao interessante fenômeno natural de muitas estruturas apresentarem uma bi-lateral simetria, o que produz o que denominamos de “beleza”. Procurando o segredo por tras disso, humanos perceberam nestas arquiteturas existe um padrao repititivo com uma razao proporcional e medindo este padrao com base na matematica encontraram o numero 1,618. Assim surgiu o mistico numero Phi e toda vez que os academicos observam o fenomeno suas mentes correm imediatamente para o Phi e pensam o fenomeno matematicamente. Sabe qual o resultado? Se cegam assim para um dos mais belos segredos da Natureza. Observando este fenomeno na selva e sem pensar com logica matematica mas sentindo-o como natural selvagem eu acabei descobrindo que aquele padrao e’ o mesmo que se repete toda vez que existe na Natureza um processo de reproducao de alguma coisa. Por exemplo, a meia haste esquerda do DNA se reproduz confeccionando a outra meia face `a direita. Mas quem executa todas estas reproducoes ‘e um flusxo de energia/informacao que corre dentro do cirtcuito dos suistemas. Quando ele nao esta ativo fica parado sempre num mesmo local. E sem usar matematica, mas curioso do porque humanos veem matematica onde nao existe matematica e sim um simples frnomeno vital, olhei o ponto de repouso dpo elemento em relacao ao tamanho da esfera do cirdcuito e vi o numero 1,618. Incomodado pequei reguas, medidores, desenhei o circuito da formiula e medi tudo. Agora tinha a certeza matematica de que, para os matematicos, aquele ponto e’ um numeo, o 1,618. Para mim sempre que ver tal fenomeno vou pensar em funcionamento sustemico, principio vital, o mecanismo das reproducoes, nunca num numero. Assim, temos duas diferentes visoes do mundo, com dois significados opostos entre si.

” Ora, mas é claro que a Natureza tem a ver com matemática. Nos colocamos um satélite em orbita de Marte, fizemos um robot descer na atmosfera no angulo corretíssimo para não ser queimado, tudo baseado na matemática.”

” Errado! A prova disso é que a tecnologia produzida pela humanidade esta’ se tornando cada vez mais desumana e anti-natural, confrontando, trombando com a Natureza.  Agora você vai ter lixo de ferro e borracha em Marte, para não dizer outros efeitos negativos para Marte. Existe outra maneira de obter conhecimento sobre Marte, que se sintoniza com o significado ultimo da Natureza. Existe outra forma de fazer tecnologia de maneira que um objeto levantar voo com sua própria energia, voe na ausência de gravidade ao senti-la e procurar o jeito, e entre na atmosfera atravessando-a, acompanhando as ondas do campo eletromagnético ou orbitando de acordo com as camadas de densidades da atmosfera até pousar no solo,… sem usar matemática, apenas os seus sensores de sentir a Natureza e se adaptar a cada lugar ou composição dela. Mas sabe porque mesmo esta’ errado? Quando você vai representar matematicamente cada uma das três partes de uma esfera, você cai numa dizima periódica que tende ao infinito. Então esta’ errado, porque a esfera não tem nada de se estender ao infinito, ela é um fenômeno que surgiu agora feita por você e continua aqui e agora, ela começa aqui e termina aqui,  nada tem a ver com infinito. Isto quer dizer que a continuação da dizima não pode se estender ao infinito, ela tem que parar antes de alguma forma. E como ela para? Não para,… ela se transforma.

Você vai dividindo uma coisa, um fenômeno natural concreto do aqui e agora, digamos, um átomo. Começa dividindo em duas partes. Depois das duas você faz 4. Das 4 faz 8… e continua. Chega a um ponto que não tem mais massa para dividir, você estará dividindo energia, o objeto não é mais um átomo. E nesse ponto você caiu na dimensão submicroscópica que é estudada pela mecânica quântica, onde as leis não são as leis do nosso mundo aqui e agora. Não sabemos ainda entender esse mundo de outras leis, mas de uma coisa temos certeza: ele é o suporte, é a base, a infraestrutura do mundo dos fenômenos aqui e agora. Estes fenômenos aqui e agora são construídos em cima daquela base, mas como não obedecem as leis da base, ele é um edifício como um castelo de areia, não tem apoio na realidade ultima.

“São nestes fenômenos irreais do aqui e agora, na construção do castelo de areia sobre areia movediça, que a matemática acerta. A matemática é uma logica errada em relacao ao mundo real ao mesmo tempo que é uma logica certa em relacao a um mundo ilusório. Se você quiser captar a logica do mundo real, procure a logica do mundo do mundo real. A matemática não nos fornece o sentido, o significado ultimo, a visão correta do mundo na sua totalidade, apenas uma visão desta nossa efêmera e imediata parte do mundo. Por isso a visão de mundo da Matrix/DNA se aproximou mais da tradução correta das verdadeiras leis, descobriu os mecanismos e amplos processos: por não ter usado a logica matemática e sim, ao observar a esfera dividida daquele jeito, apenas a memorizou daquele jeito, evitando a tentação de julga-la matematicamente como os humanos fazem normalmente.”

Sintese Pos-Moderna (Postmodern Synthesis): Novo remendo na teoria Darwinista?

outubro 6th, 2017

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(Obs: Este artigo foi copiado abaixo para fazer a traducao porque e’ muito importante)

Como tem sugerido a Teoria da Matrix/DNA, a Teoria de Darwin com apenas suas tres variaveis (variacao, hereditariedade, selecao), esta’ muito longe de ser a complete descricao da evolucao natural. Dentro de seus proprios aposentos, seus defensores tem percebido falhas e vao aos poucos acrescentando mais detalhes, novas variaveis ( como horizontal gene transfer) e inaugurando novos nomes para a teoria. Assim que surgiu o nome “Modern Synthesis”. Porem ja existem cientistas nao satisfeitos com falahas na Sintese Moderna e estao sugerindo mais um novo nome.

O texto abaixo, demonstra algo, extraido do link:

http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080917/full/455281a.html

“Gunter Wagner, an evolutionary theorist at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, puts up a slide suggesting the words ‘Postmodern Synthesis’.

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O que e’ – ou foi – a Sintese Moderna:

Between about 1920 and 1940, researchers such as the American Sewall Wright and the Englishmen Ronald Fisher and J. B. S. Haldane took Charles Darwin’s ideas about natural selection and Gregor Mendel’s insights into how traits pass from parents to offspring — which many biologists of the time believed antithetical — and fused them into a mathematical description of the genetic makeup of populations and how it changes. That fusion was the modern synthesis. It treats an organism’s form, or phenotype, as a readout of its hereditary information, or genotype. Change is explained as one version of a gene being replaced by another. Natural selection acts by changing the frequency of genes in the next generation according to the fitness of phenotypes in this one. In this world view, the gene is a black box, its relationship to phenotype is a one-way street, and the environment, both cellular and external, is a selective filter imposed on the readout of the genes, rather than something that can influence an organism’s form directly.

O que ha’ de errado com a Moderna Sintese?

What’s wrong with this picture, say the would-be extenders at Altenberg and elsewhere, is what it leaves out. Molecular biology, cell biology and genomics have provided a much richer picture of how genotypes make phenotypes. The extenders claim that enough insights have now come from this and other research for it to be time to re-examine problems that the modern synthesis doesn’t address. These problems include some of the key turning points in evolution: the patterns and changes seen in the fossil record as new branches spring from the tree of life and new anatomies — skeletons, limbs, brains — come into being. “When the public thinks about evolution, they think about the origin of wings and the invasion of the land,” says Graham Budd, a palaeobiologist at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. “But these are things that evolutionary theory has told us little about.”

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Biological theory: Postmodern evolution?

Published online 17 September 2008 | Nature 455, 281-284 (2008) | doi:10.1038/455281a –

This summer a group of high-profile researchers met in Altenberg, Austria, to try and plot the future course of evolutionary theory. John Whitfield was there.

“Oh my gosh,” says Massimo Pigliucci, “maybe I shouldn’t use that term.” Pigliucci, responding to comments on his talk about how living things respond to their environment, and what it means for evolution, has just let slip the p-word. Later the same day, Günter Wagner, an evolutionary theorist at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, puts up a slide bearing the words ‘Postmodern Synthesis’. Pigliucci is moved to make an editorial suggestion from the floor: “I’d really rather we didn’t use that term.” Wagner says the slide was intended to be tongue-in-cheek, but Pigliucci is worried about the impression the word creates: “If there’s one thing we don’t want, it’s for people to get the idea that there’s a bunch of evolutionary theories out there, and that they’re all equal.”

A lot of scientists loathe what they take to be postmodernism’s intellectual relativism, and shy away from using the word. But doing so puts Pigliucci in something of a bind. An evolutionary ecologist at the State University of New York in Stony Brook, Pigliucci is one of the conveners of this small meeting on the future of evolutionary thought taking place at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research in Altenberg, Austria. The meeting has received a fair amount of hype — in the blogosphere it was dubbed ‘The Woodstock of Evolution’. Its agenda is, pretty explicitly, to go beyond the ‘modern synthesis’ that has held sway in evolutionary theory since the middle of the twentieth century. And in everyday speech, it is pretty clear what comes after the modern.

   The modern synthesis is good at modelling the survival of the fittest, but not the arrival of the fittest.

What’s more, some of this work sounds as though it fits the term quite nicely. Over dinner at the meeting’s end, Pigliucci expresses his hope of “moving from a gene-centric view of causality in evolution to a pluralist, multilevel causality”. Postmodernists in the humanities call this ‘decentering’, and they are all for it. Over the course of the meeting, it’s fairly clear that the means to this pluralist end are being sought through mixing and matching neglected ideas and old problems from biology’s past with the latest experimental and analytical techniques. Apply that sort of bricolage to architecture and you get the sort of brutalist-right-angle here, classical-column-there, swirling-titanium-ceiling-above-it-all look that is normally pigeonholed, for better or worse, as postmodern.

Evolution of ideas

Leaving aside the troublesome adjective, what is the modernism that the Altenburg meeting is meant to move beyond — or to use Pigliucci’s preferred term, ‘extend’1? Between about 1920 and 1940, researchers such as the American Sewall Wright and the Englishmen Ronald Fisher and J. B. S. Haldane took Charles Darwin’s ideas about natural selection and Gregor Mendel’s insights into how traits pass from parents to offspring — which many biologists of the time believed antithetical — and fused them into a mathematical description of the genetic makeup of populations and how it changes. That fusion was the modern synthesis. It treats an organism’s form, or phenotype, as a readout of its hereditary information, or genotype. Change is explained as one version of a gene being replaced by another. Natural selection acts by changing the frequency of genes in the next generation according to the fitness of phenotypes in this one. In this world view, the gene is a black box, its relationship to phenotype is a one-way street, and the environment, both cellular and external, is a selective filter imposed on the readout of the genes, rather than something that can influence an organism’s form directly.

What’s wrong with this picture, say the would-be extenders at Altenberg and elsewhere, is what it leaves out. Molecular biology, cell biology and genomics have provided a much richer picture of how genotypes make phenotypes. The extenders claim that enough insights have now come from this and other research for it to be time to re-examine problems that the modern synthesis doesn’t address. These problems include some of the key turning points in evolution: the patterns and changes seen in the fossil record as new branches spring from the tree of life and new anatomies — skeletons, limbs, brains — come into being. “When the public thinks about evolution, they think about the origin of wings and the invasion of the land,” says Graham Budd, a palaeobiologist at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. “But these are things that evolutionary theory has told us little about.”

Bring on the kangaroos

The question of how form changes in individuals is the province of developmental biology, and genetic studies have now revealed a lot about how the mechanisms of development have evolved. Many see the evolutionary developmental biology — ‘evo-devo’ — that is emerging from this work as the key ingredient needed to extend or surpass the modern synthesis.

“Evolution needs a theory of body construction and change, as well as population construction and change,” says Scott Gilbert, an evo-devo researcher at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, who was not in Altenberg but who is writing a book on extending the evolutionary synthesis in similar directions. “The modern synthesis is remarkably good at modelling the survival of the fittest, but not good at modelling the arrival of the fittest.” To explain the production of novel features, such as limbs and feathers, Gilbert and like-minded biologists want a theory in which the environment is defined broadly enough to include the developing body, which is the primary context in which the genes are expressed. Genes shape this developing environment, but the dynamic environment also shapes the expression of the genes. And it does so directly, rather than through some later selection. “The gene will continue to be centre stage,” says Gilbert, “but it will be seen as both active and acted upon. It’s not going to be the unmoved mover.”

The importance of the environment acting on the genome can be seen in plasticity, the ability of the same genes to give rise to radically different phenotypes in different conditions — as studied by several of the Altenberg group. Pigliucci, who works on invasive plant species, gave the example of species that lie low in a new environment for several years before becoming a problem. He puts this down to plasticity and the Baldwin effect. In 1896 James Baldwin, an American psychologist, suggested that over the generations, tricks that at first have to be learned can become hard-wired as genes fix variations caused by the environment. “It could be that the plants arrive in a new environment and hang on thanks to plasticity — it gains time for natural selection to kick in,” says Pigliucci. To begin with, the genes follow adaptation rather than leading it, as “bookkeepers of what’s happening”. Once the genes have caught up, and the immigrant can take adaptation to the environment as read, it is able to become dominant.

Plasticity also allows organisms to make the most of their mutations. “The myopic view — that we don’t need to worry about phenotypic variation, that it is abundant, always small and that it goes in all possible directions — doesn’t correspond to the conservation we’ve seen in developmental systems,” Marc Kirschner, a systems biologist at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, told the Altenberg meeting. To grow a limb you don’t need mutations in every gene involved in limb building; life can use the facts that muscle cells naturally align with bone, nerve cells stabilize when they plug into muscles, and blood vessels grow towards areas low in oxygen to leverage a small genetic change into an important difference. Again, the changing environment within the developing body is part of the process by which the gene is expressed: Kirschner calls it facilitated variation2.

As an example, he points to the discovery that the narrow, tweezer-like beak of an insect-eating finch can become the fat, nutcracking beak of a seed-eater by increasing the activity of a single gene involved in bone formation3. “Because developmental systems are so integrated and self-regulating, you can make a large functional change without a large genetic change,” says Kirschner. Pigliucci gave a more speculative example of the possible evolutionary consequences of such changes, showing a slide juxtaposing a kangaroo and a dog that had been born without forelimbs but learnt to walk on its hind legs. “It’s hard to imagine that this kind of change doesn’t have anything to do with the evolution of bipedalism,” he told the meeting.

Self-organizing cells

Pigliucci and Kirschner think that the capacity of small genetic changes to trigger large shifts results in waves of innovation separated by seeming lulls in which evolution stablizes and integrates the new arrangements. This matches some aspects of the fossil record, where bursts of innovation and diversification are interspersed by much longer periods of stasis — a pattern known as punctuated equilibrium, first described by the late Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge of the American Museum of Natural History in the 1970s. Gilbert, who studies turtles, sees something similar: “Turtle biologists joke that one Tuesday in the late Triassic there weren’t any turtles, and by the weekend the world was full of turtles. One reason why might be that it’s not all that hard to make a shell — all the genes are probably there already, and it doesn’t take many changes to get a shell.”

Stuart Newman, a developmental biologist at New York Medical College, takes such ideas further than most, arguing that the abilities that cells have to self-organize into complex structures can lead to major evolutionary innovations such as the origin of the vertebrate limb — a problem on which he collaborates with Altenberg’s other organizer, evo-devo researcher Gerd Muller of the University of Vienna, Austria4 — with perhaps little or no genetic change. “You can’t deny the force of selection in genetic evolution,” says Newman, “but in my view this is stabilizing and fine-tuning forms that originate due to other processes.”

The same process might have given rise to animals themselves. The further you turn back the clock through geological time, Newman believes, the weaker genetic regulation of development becomes relative to plasticity and self-organization. The development of the most basic features of multicellular organisms some 600 million years ago, in the late Proterozoic, might have been the rapid and spontaneous result of molecules already present on unicellular organisms doing new jobs when cells stick together5. “You don’t need incremental change under gradual selection regimes to get attributes such as segmented, hollow or multilayered bodies,” says Newman. “You can get it all with thermodynamics and self-organization.”

The problem is testing such ideas. Newman suggests that knocking out the genes that stabilize development in model laboratory organisms might provide insights, but extrapolating back from modern organisms to their distant ancestors is fraught with problems. It is difficult to see how such an approach can get beyond the theoretical, says Budd, adding that what evidence there is weighs against Newman’s hypothesis. “Clearly there are physical and chemical processes that affect cells,” says Budd. “But I don’t think there is any evidence at all for the idea that development was more permissive and plastic [in the Proterozoic] and that body plans could spontaneously emerge. The fossil record shows that body plans appeared sequentially in a series of innovations, not in a misty way at the bottom of the tree.”

Confusing what can happen and what did happen is a common criticism of the ideas raised at Altenberg. For example, some lab studies lend support to the Baldwin effect: experiments with fruitflies show that following up an environmental stress with selective breeding can produce animals that show the phenotypic response to that stress without having experienced it6. But there is little evidence so far that genetic change in wild populations takes this course, says Wagner. “The idea that environmentally induced changes are the path-breaker for genetic fixation is an old one, but I’m not yet convinced that’s how it works in real populations,” he says.

“These notions haven’t forced us to change the neo-darwinian paradigm,” says Jerry Coyne, an evolutionary geneticist at the University of Chicago. Coyne has little time for “evo-devotees”7 who think that the discipline will cause a revolution in biology. Researchers coming at evolution from population genetics are particularly resistant to any attempt to displace natural selection from the place at the heart of evolutionary theory that the modern synthesis provided it with. “The whole thing about natural selection being an insufficient paradigm seems grossly overblown,” says Coyne. “There are a lot of interesting new things coming out that will change our view of evolution. But to say the modern synthesis is incomplete or fatally flawed is fatuous.”

And it is worth noting that you can work in evo-devo and not subscribe to such ideas. Sean Carroll of the University of Wisconsin in Madison sees things in terms of bridge-building, not replacement. “What did population genetics and palaeontology have to do with each other for the past 80 years? Nothing. The modern synthesis describes evolution within populations — it’s agnostic or silent about the cumulative effect of that process,” he says. By revealing the genetic basis of development, and showing how genetics relates to morphology, evo-devo “sits right in the middle” of the two disciplines, says Carroll.

The true message of evo-devo, Carroll says, is that developmental processes have evolved in a way that allows small aspects of form to be tweaked without affecting the whole organism — something which tends to reinforce the modern synthesis’s view of evolution as incremental8. “Because we can get large effects when we manipulate genes in development, the spectre that these things have happened in history is out there,” says Carroll. “But just because we can make freaky-looking animals in one step, I’m unwilling to say that evolution works that way.” Wagner and his colleagues have recently shown that altering many genes in mice produces only a small effect9, countering the idea that most individual genes have such a wide-ranging influence that changing them would be fatal.

The differences of opinion suggest that, although evo-devo may once have looked as if it would unify population genetics and development, so far it has done more to give new voice to important problems that had been pushed to the margin — this was a strong note at Altenberg, making the meeting as much about revivalism as revolution. “Originally, the idea was that evo-devo was going to be the synthesis between evolution and development — now it is part of what needs to be done to get there,” says Alan Love, a philosopher of science at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis who attended Altenberg. “There is still a lot of outstanding work to do on fitting the pieces together, but no consensus on how to go about that right now.” Nevertheless, he says, that’s no cause for alarm. “What is needed is to incorporate empirical findings into the bigger picture. It took populations genetics 25 years to do that and make the modern synthesis. As far as evo-devo goes, I’d say we’re smack dab in the middle of that process.”

Preaching to the converted?

David Krakauer, an evolutionary theorist at the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico who was not at Altenberg, agrees. “It’s a matter of finally unifying two areas that haven’t spoken to one another,” he says. “To tackle any modern problem in evolutionary biology, you’ll have to use development and the dynamics of the genes that underlie it.” He’s quite enthusiastic about the possibility of bringing together mathematical theories of pattern formation, of the kind favoured by Newman, and the large body of theory on genetic change between generations used by population geneticists such as Coyne. But at the same time, he can see forces beyond the content of the theories that may keep them apart: “It’s not about totally incompatible world views, it’s about who holds the torch — who are the legitimate heirs to the Darwinian intellectual estate.”

Love saw the Altenberg meeting as an attempt to bridge the divide, but one that, by avoiding conflict (partly through invitations being declined), ended up a little one-sided. “Altenberg was an attempt to pull people together; the hard part was that it didn’t pull in people who were less than sympathetic towards one another,” he says. “It could have been a much more eraser-throwing meeting, but there is no reward for organizing that — you don’t get another grant by trying to get people in the same room, you just have to take time away from the lab or fieldwork.”

And there are forces at play beyond jockeying for disciplinary prestige. Never mind what can happen and what did happen. What should happen? It’s a fight that evolutionary theory — rooted as it is in a world view shaped by Victorian capitalism — has always found itself dragged into. To give one example, the championing of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ in the fossil record by Gould and Eldredge was easily construed by participants on both sides of the debate in the 1970s as an attack from the political left — part of a broader rising of hackles at the arrival of sociobiology, selfish genes and the like. Evolutionary ideas and political metaphors still seem to seek each other out — in an extended synthesis, says Gilbert, “the gene will be a much more constitutional monarch, taking instructions from the cell and environment”.

Eva Jablonka of the University of Tel Aviv, Israel, is explicit about a political side to her work. She advocates the importance of epigenetic inheritance — traits that can be passed on without changes to DNA sequence. These can be induced by environmental stressors such as temperature, diet or environmental chemicals. Such mechanisms, and insults, may be behind some inherited diseases, she says, in which case we have a responsibility to curb and reverse them. “There are social implications to our approach,” says Jablonka. “Our way of looking at heredity and evolution counters genetic determinism and its political implications.” Jablonka is one of the Altenberg attendees most comfortable with the term ‘postmodern’.

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Yet there was no sense at Altenberg of a desire to attack evolutionary theory from the left. Quite the reverse — the dominant political concern was a fear of attack from fundamentalists. As Gould discovered, creationists seize on any hint of splits in evolutionary theory or dissatisfaction with Darwinism. In the past couple of decades, everyone has become keenly aware of this, regardless of their satisfaction or otherwise with the modern synthesis. “You always feel like you’re trying to cover your rear,” says Love. “If you criticize, it’s like handing ammunition to these folks.” So don’t criticize in a grandstanding way, says Coyne: “People shouldn’t suppress their differences to placate creationists, but to suggest that neo-Darwinism has reached some kind of crisis point plays into creationists’ hands,” he says. It is tempting to say that it’s not just genes that express themselves in an environment that responds and reshapes itself around them, feeding back and complicating matters beyond simple cause and effect; the same applies to ideas. And if that seems a bit self-referential — well, that’s postmodernism.

Video: Irreducivel Complexidade versus Evolucao da Agulha Molecular versus Heranca da Evolucao Cosmologica

outubro 4th, 2017

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Este artigo comecou aqui: https://evolutionnews.org/2017/09/charles-darwin-michael-behe-two-revolutionary-scientists/

e revelou-se de grande importancia para divulfdgacao da Matrix/DNA devido a grande polemica e o corolario de sites se abindo para o tema, o que noss fara’ proceder a uma pesquisa intense nestes sites, sempre tentando publicar a versapo da matricx. Outro link que se segue e’: http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080917/full/455281a.html , e

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_three_secretion_system

Michael Behe e o Misterio das Maquinas Moleculares

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3371&v=7ToSEAj2V0s

At this link ( http://theuniversalmatrix.com/en-us/articles/?p=15 ) is solved how the bacterial flagellum was built:
1) By “previous” design, but, not intelligent design, in the way that mother giraffe does not apply intelligence for building a new baby giraffe. The process applied for building the bacterial flagellum was pure natural genetics which is an evolutionary product from a mechanism that emerged with the Big Bang. So, the ultimate answer (if it is or don’t intelligent design, randomness or other thing), is unknown.
2) The bacterial flagellum is really irreducible complexity to anything existed before at Earth surface. But it is reducible ( all its parts) to the building blocks of galaxies, like this Milk Way (see the astronomic model at the website), which is the real last non-biological ancestor (LUCA). The way a galaxy rotates creating the spiral arms contains a kind of motor that is the same configuration of bacterial flagellum. So, there is irreducible complexity in relation to Earth, but there is no irreducible complexity in relation to natural astronomic systems;
3) We need to understand that the stupid matter of this lost planet did not invented – first time in the universe –  these complex things like genetic code, human beings, consciousness, etc. But, the Matrix/DNA Theory, working with the approach of systemic and not reductionist or mystical thoughts, re-wrote the Universal History from today to the origins of this world, finding that everything complex here had a long evolutionary history that began with a few information that can be seen at any natural light wave. So, the effect (our perceived world) is entirely explained but, the cause escapes from us because the source is beyond and before the Big Bang, then, as we can’t advancing beyond the last material frontier, what is or who is, is it intelligent or not,… the source still is merely humans conjectures.

A Formacao do Planeta e a Origem da Vida

outubro 3rd, 2017

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(Artigo em construção: rever e anotar novidades)

32:32 – Termal vents (black smoker) resulta da constante movimentacao das placas tectonicas que provocam a penetracao da agua no interior do planeta reagindo com magma e sendo expelida como vapor negro, e nisso traz consigo informacoes matriciais do nucleo da Terra.

33:08 – Sulfite minerals – provindo das aguas profundas misturadas com magma, estes minerais tem a propriedade de catalizar reacoes quimicas que produzem moleculas primordiais da vida, o que confirma a nossa teoria matricial de que  os primeiros 50% da abiogenese foi dirigido por informacoes do nucleo planetario. Mas este fato chama atencao para outro aspecto matricial que estamos tentando desvendar. Parece que os elementos atomicos que formam as primeiras moleculas vitais possuem um estado vibracional/frequencia de onda especifico do espectro da onda de luz (traduzido em energia). Quando estao em ambientes dominados pelas outras seis faixas da onda estao instaveis, e assim nao podem formar mutuas conexoes duradouras entre si. Mas quando estao num ambiente dominado pela mesma faixa que a sua, se estabilizam e formam as conecoes. Entao, catalise seria isto: um elemento do ambiente externo de identidade igual dos elementos reagentes. E nisso vai bater a teoria matricial, pois o sulfite pertence ao nucleo planetario entao a uma das primeiras faixas de onda, enquanto a vida comeca por suas combinacoes iniciais que dizem respeito tambem as primeiras faixas de onda.