Os Territórios da Razão Humana – Critica sobre o que é conhecimento de fato e o que é crença disfarçada nas Ciências

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 Artigo de autor de livro que comprei no Kindle:  

The Territories of Human Reason por Alister McGrath

Cover for 

The Territories of Human Reason

( Obs.: Os parágrafos aqui copiados são para serem traduzidos porque este e um ótimo método para  memorizar informações e refletir nelas enquanto se traduz)

https://iai.tv/articles/between-knowing-and-believing-auid-1207

Between Knowing and Believing

Can we be certain that what we now think are facts are not merely beliefs?

Knowledge too often turns out to be a disguised (disfarçada) belief. 

” I have reluctantly come to the view that I know less and believe more – not because I have lapsed into some form of credulity, but rather because much of what I once thought was knowledge now seems to be opinion or belief. It leaves us with the awkward question, which we need to confront honestly: how can we be sure that what we think we now know is not in fact simply a belief? And is the difference between them partly a matter of our location in the historical process?”

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“If scientific theories that once commanded widespread support had now been displaced by superior alternatives, who could predict what would happen to these new theories in the future? These theories might be better than those they had supplanted; but were they right? Might they not be transient staging-posts, rather than final resting places? ”

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“How, I wondered, could Popper seriously believe that all scientific “theories are, and remain hypotheses: they are conjecture (doxa) as opposed to indubitable knowledge (episteme).”

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A Filosofia deve sempre lembrar o homem suas limitacoes cerebrais:

” For Russell, “to teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it.”

Encouraged by what I read, I explored more of Russell. For Russell, human aspirations to rationality were compromised by the destructive “intellectual vice” of a natural human craving for certainty, which could not be reconciled with the limited capacities of human reason on the one hand, and the complexity of the real world on the other. Philosophy, Russell suggested, was a discipline deeply attuned to this dilemma, enabling reflective human beings to cope with their situation”

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“The Enlightenment championed the idea of a universal human rationality, valid at all times and places. Yet a more sceptical attitude has increasingly gained sway, seeing this as an essentially political or cultural assertion that certain Eurocentric ways of thinking are universally valid, and hence legitimating the intellectual colonization of other parts of the world, and the suppression of other forms of rationality”

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” This scientific imperialism – now usually contracted to “scientism” – finds itself trapped in a viciously circular argument from which no experiment can extricate it, in that it has to assume its own authority in order to confirm it. The insistence on the part of some that all questions be framed scientifically may seem like legitimate science to some, but will be seen as an illegitimate strategy of intellectual colonization by others.”

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” The scientific consensus of the first decade of the twentieth century – regularly presented at that time as secure scientific knowledge – was that the universe was more or less the same today as it always had been. Yet this once fashionable and seemingly reliable view has been eclipsed by the seemingly unstoppable rise of the theory of cosmic origins generally known as the “Big Bang”. What was once thought to be right – and hence to be “knowledge” – was simply an outdated interpretation, an opinion now considered to be wrong.”

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“So is knowledge socially located? To put this another way, is what is deemed “knowledge” in one historical and cultural situation deemed to be “belief” in another? It is an unsettling thought. The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz argued that what we call “common sense” is demonstrably not a universal way of thinking, but is “historically constructed,” varying from one historical location to another.”

Matrix/DNA: Esta e’ mais uma evidencia de que os dominantes predadores criam a cultura fazendo sua distorcida interpretação dos fatos: dominantes de um lugar nem sempre imitam as interpretações de outro dominante de outro lugar.”

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“Historical research shows up the existence of multiple forms of rationality in different cultural and historical contexts. They may have been suppressed in the past by the Enlightenment monomyth of a single universal rationality. However, what some are calling “epistemological decolonization” is gaining sway, especially in intellectual circles in South America and southern Africa.”

Matrix/DNA: A visão do mundo do semi-símio da selva amazônica e’ uma forma de raciocinar diferente da forma europeia ou anglo-saxônica espalhada pelo mundo. E talvez, por ser mais embasada na natureza direta e real, seja mais acurada.

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” So does this mean that we abandon any hope of finding a rational way of thinking, capable of engaging questions about how our universe functions, and deeper existential questions about meaning, value, and purpose? No. This does not give us any reason to believe what we like. It rather invites us to think more deeply about what it means to be rational. This concern lies behind my recent work The Territories of Human Reason, which explores the historical plurality of cultural rationalities on the one hand, and the diversity of methodologies used in the natural sciences on the other, and tries to understand how a single person can be said to act rationally while holding views that have quite different rational foundations.

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